Outside the highly publicized victories in the game of Go, there have been numerous successful applications of deep learning in the elds of information retrieval, computer vision, and speech recognition. In cybersecurity, an increasing number of companies have begun exploring the use of deep learning (DL) in a variety of security tasks with malware detection among the more popular.
INTRODUCTION
Malware detection has evolved sigi cantly over the past. Approaches have been introduced that range from signature-based solutions that compare an unidenti ed piece of code to known malware to sandboxing solutions that execute a le within a virtual environment so as to determine whether the le is malicious or not. Unfortunately, these technologies seem to quickly fall behind in the never-ending ba le against malware infection. According to a recent report from Symantec Corporation [26] , one million malware variants hit the Internet every day and go completely undetected by most of the common cybersecurity technologies in use today.
Substantial progress in neural network research, or deep learning (DL), has provided promising alternatives to the cybersecurity community in the form of automatic feature learning. Recent research has demonstrated that malware detection approaches based on deep neural networks (DNNs) can recognize abstract complex pa erns from a large amount of malware samples. is could o er a far be er way to detect all types of malware, even in instances of heavy mutation [2, 7, 8, 14, 17-19, 23, 28] .
Despite their potential, deep neural architectures, like all other machine learning approaches, are vulnerable to what is known as adversarial samples [3, 6, 25] . is means that these systems can be easily deceived by non-obvious and potentially dangerous manipulations [5, 9, 12, 27] . To be more speci c, an adversary can infer the model underlying an application, examine feature/class importance, and identify the features that have greatest signi cant impact on correct classi cation. With this knowledge of feature importance, an adversary can, with minimal e ort, cra an adversarial samplea synthetic example generated by slightly modifying a real example in order to trick deep learning system into "believing" this modi ed sample belongs to an incorrect class with high con dence.
is aw has been widely exploited to fool DNNs trained for image recognition (e.g., [9, 21, 27] ). With the broad adoption of DNNs in malware detection, we speculate malware authors will also increasingly seek to exploit this vulnerability to circumvent malware detection. Recent research has already demonstrated that a malware author can leverage feature amplitude inequilibrium to bypass malware detectors powered by DNNs [1, 10] .
Past research [9, 22] in developing defense mechanisms relies on strong assumptions, which typically do not hold in many real-world scenarios. Also, these proposed techniques can only be empirically validated and do not provide any theoretical guarantees. is is particularly disconcerting when they are applied to security-critical applications such as malware detection.
Here we propose a new technical approach that can be empirically and theoretically guaranteed to be e ective for malware KDD 2017 Research Paper KDD '17, August 13-17, 2017 , Halifax, NS, Canada detection and, more importantly, resistant to adversarial manipulation. To be speci c, we introduce random feature nulli cation to both the training and testing phases of DNN models, making the architectures non-deterministic. is non-deterministic nature is primarily useful when a ackers a empt to examine feature/class importance or when a DNN model uses input for classi cation. Even if a ackers could infer critical features and construct a reasonable adversarial sample, the stochasticity we introduce into the model's input processing signi cantly reduces the e ectiveness of adversarial samples.
Technically speaking, our random feature nulli cation approach can also be viewed as stochastically "dropping" or omi ing sensory inputs. It can be viewed as a special case of dropout regularization [24] , which involves randomly dropping unit activities (along with their connections), especially in the hidden layers, of a standard DNN. However, in normal drop-out, a DNN is treated as a deterministic system at test-time 2 which means that critical features of the DNN model can still be correctly identi ed and manipulated to synthesize adversarial samples. Our approach is fundamentally di erent in that we nullify features at both train and test time. In Section 5, we compare our random feature nulli cation with standard drop-out. e simple approach proposed is bene cial for several key reasons. First, random feature nulli cation makes it much more difcult for a ackers to exploit the "blind spots" of DNNs. Second, our adversary-resistant DNNs maintain desirable classi cation performance while requiring only minimal modi cation to existing underlying architecture. ird, the technique we propose theoretically guarantees the resistance of DL to adversarial samples. Lastly, while this work is primarily motivated by the need to safeguard DNN models used in malware detection, it should be noted that the proposed technique is rather general and can be readily applied to other applications where deep learning proves to be useful, such as image recognition. We demonstrate this applicability using two additional, publicly-available datasets in Section 5. e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on adversarial samples and in Section 3 a survey of relevant work. Section 4 presents our technique and its properties. Experimental results are shown in Section 5, where our technique is compared to other approaches. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our work and points our future directions.
BACKGROUND
Even though a well-trained model is capable of recognizing outof-sample pa erns, a deep neural architecture can be easily fooled by introducing perturbations to the input samples that are o en indistinguishable to the human eye [27] . ese so-called "blind spots", or adversarial samples, exist because the input space of a DNN is too broad to be fully explored [9] . Given this, an adversary can uncover speci c data samples in the input space that bypass DNN models. More speci cally, work [9] has shown that a ackers can nd the most powerful blind spots through e ective optimization procedures. In multi-class classi cation tasks, the adversarial samples uncovered through this optimization can cause a DNN model to classify a data point under an incorrect category.
Furthermore, other work [27] shows that for DNN models that share the same design goal, i.e. recognizing the same image set, all of these models approximate a common highly complex, nonlinear function. erefore, a relatively large fraction of adversarial examples generated from one trained DNN will be misclassi ed by other DNN models trained on the same original data set but with di erent hyper-parameters. Given a target DNN, we refer to adversarial samples that are generated from other di erent DNN models but still maintain their a ack e cacy against the target as cross-model adversarial samples.
Adversarial samples can be generated by computing the derivative of the cost function with respect to the network's input variables. e gradient of any input sample represents a direction vector in this high-dimensional input space. Along this direction, any small change of this input sample will cause a DNN to generate a completely di erent prediction result. is particular direction is important since it represents the most e ective way to degrade the performance of a DNN. Discovering this particular direction is done by passing the layer gradients from the output layer all the way back to the input layer via back-propagation of errors. e gradient at the input may then be applied to the input samples to cra an adversarial example.
To be more speci c, de ne a cost function L(θ, X , Y ), where θ , X and Y denotes the parameters of the DNN, the input dataset, and the corresponding labels respectively. In general, adversarial samples are created by adding an adversarial perturbation δX to real samples. e fast gradient sign method [9] was proposed for calculating adversarial perturbations as follows:
here δX is calculated by multiplying the sign of the gradients of the real sample X with some coe cient ϕ. J L (X ) denotes the derivative of the cost function L(·) with respect to X . ϕ controls the scale of the gradients to be added. An adversarial perturbation indicates the actual direction vector to be added to the real samples. is vector drives a data point X towards a direction that the cost function L(·) is most sensitive to. However, it should be noted that δX must be maintained within a small scale. Otherwise adding δX will cause signi cant distortions to real samples, leaving the manipulation to be easily detected.
RELATED WORK
In order to defend against adversarial samples, recent research has mainly focused on two di erent approaches -data augmentation and model complexity enhancement. In this section, we summarize these techniques and discuss their limitations as follows.
Data Augmentation
To resolve the issue of "blind spots" (a more informal name given to adversarial samples), many methods which could be considered as sophisticated forms of data augmentation 3 have been proposed (e.g. [9, 11, 20] ). In principle, these methods expand the training set by combining known samples with potential blind spots, the process of which is called adversarial training [9] . Here, we analyze the limitations of data augmentation mechanisms and argue that these limitations also apply to adversarial training methods.
Given the high dimensionality of data distributions that a DNN typically learns from, the input space is generally too broad to be fully explored [9] . is implies that, for each DNN model, there could also be an adversarial space carrying an in nite amount of blind spots. erefore, data augmentation based approaches must face the challenge of covering these very large spaces. Since adversarial training is a form of data augmentation, such a tactic cannot possibly hope to cover an in nite space.
Adversarial training can be formally described as adding a regularization term known as DataGrad to a DNN's training loss function [20] . e regularization penalizes the directions uncovered by adversarial perturbations (introduced in Section 2). erefore, adversarial training works to improve the worst case performance of a standard DNN. Treating the standard DNN much like a generative model, adversarial samples are produced via back-propagation and mixed into the training set and directly integrated into the model's learning phase. Despite the fact that there exists an innite amount of adversarial samples, adversarial training has been shown to be e ective in defending against those which are powerful and easily cra ed. is is largely due to the fact that, in most adversarial training approaches [9, 20] , adversarial samples can be generated e ciently for a particular type of DNN. e fast gradient sign method [9] can generate a large pool of adversarial samples quickly while DataGrad [20] focuses on dynamically generating them per every parameter update. However, the simplicity and e ciency of generating adversarial samples also makes adversarial training vulnerable when these two properties are exploited to attack the adversarial training method itself. Given that there exists an in nite supply of adversarial samples, we would need to repeat an adversarial training procedure each time a new adversarial example is encountered. Let us brie y consider DataGrad [20] , which could be viewed as taking advantage of adversarial perturbations to be er explore the underlying data manifold. While this leads to improved generalization, it does not o er any guarantees in covering all possible blind-spots. In this work, we do not address this issue by training a DNN model that covers the entire adversarial space. Rather, our design principle is to increase the di culty for adversaries in nding the adversarial space e ciently.
Enhancing Model Complexity
DNN models are already complex, with respect to both the nonlinear function that they try to approximate as well as their layered composition of many parameters. However, the underlying architecture is straightforward when it comes to tracing the ow of information forwards and backwards, greatly alleviating the e ort in generating adversarial samples. erefore, several ideas [11, 22] have been proposed to enhance the complexity of DNN models, aiming to improve the tolerance of complex DNN models with respect to adversarial samples generated from simple DNN models.
[22] developed a defensive distillation mechanism, which trains a DNN from data samples that are "distilled" from another DNN. By using the knowledge transferred from the other DNN, the learned
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DNN classi ers become less sensitive to adversarial samples. Although shown to be e ective, this method is still vulnerable. is is because both DNN models used in this defense can be approximated by an adversary via training two other DNN models that share the same functionality and have similar performance. Once the two approximating DNN models are learned, the a acker can generate adversarial samples speci c to this distillation-enhanced DNN model. Similar to [22] , [11] proposed to stack an auto-encoder together with a standard DNN. It shows that this auto-encoding enhancement increases a DNN's resistance to adversarial samples. However, the authors also admit that this stacked model can also be easily approximated and exploited.
Given the observation and analysis above, going beyond concealing the adversarial space, we argue that an adversary-resistant DNN model also needs to be robust against adversarial samples generated from its best approximation. In light of this argument, this paper presents a new adversary-resistant DNN that not only increases the di culty in nding its blind spots but also "immunizes" itself against adversarial samples generated from its best approximation. Figure 1 illustrates how a DNN would be modi ed with our random feature nulli cation method. Di erent from a standard DNN, the method introduces an additional layer between the input and the rst hidden layer. is intermediate layer is stochastic, serving as a source of randomness during both training and testing phases. In particular, it randomly nulli es or masks the features within the input. Let us consider image recognition as an example. When a DNN passes an image sample through the layer, it randomly cancels out some pixels within the image and then feeds the partially corrupted image to the rst hidden layer. e proportion of pixels nulli ed is determined from the hyper parameters µ p and σ 2 p . Here, in addition to describing feature nulli cation and how to train a model using it, we will explain why our method o ers some theoretical guarantees of resistance to adversarial samples and how it is di erent from other adversary-resistant techniques.
RANDOM FEATURE NULLIFICATION

Model Description
Given input samples denoted by X ∈ R N ×M , where N and M denote the number of samples and features, respectively, random feature nulli cation is simply performing element-wise multiplication of X withÎ p . Here,Î p ∈ R N ×M is a mask matrix with the same dimensions as X . Note that in performing random nulli cation, it is inevitable that some feature information, which might be useful for classi cation, will be lost. To compensate for this, we choose a di erent nulli cation rate p i for each data sample. We hypothesize that this process could potentially lead to a be er exploration of the input data's underlying manifold during training, which might result in slightly be er classi cation performance. is is because that although DNN models [24] trained with all neurons preserved can work well on a training set, these models are more likely to produce worse testing results than those trained with randomly selected neurons. Recent work [24] inspired us to further increase the randomness to be added during training by also treating p i as a random variable. More speci cally, in our training algorithm, not only which neurons to be nulli ed are randomly selected, but also how many neurons to be nulli ed are randomly determined.
When training a DNN, for each input sample x i a corresponding I p i is generated, where I p i is a binary vector, with each element being either 0 or 1. In I p i , the total number of zeros, determined by p i , are randomly distributed. Without loss of generality, here we select two typical random distributions, i.e. the Gaussian distribution for p i and the uniform distribution for generating I p . However, it is also possible to adopt other random distributions for these two cases. Formally, we denote the number of zeros in I p i as M · p i , which will be randomly located, where · is the ceiling function. p i is sampled from a Gaussian distribution N(µ p , σ 2 p ). From Figure 1 , random feature nulli cation can be viewed as a process in which a specialized layer simply passes nulli ed input to a standard DNN. As such, the objective function of a DNN with random feature nulli cation can be de ned as follows.
Here, i is the label of the input x i and θ represents the set of model parameters. e random feature nulli cation process is represented by function q(x i ,
During training, Equation (2) can be solved using stochastic gradient descent in a manner similar to that of a standard DNN. e only di erence is that for each training sample, the randomly picked I p i is xed during forward and backward propagation until the next training sample arrives. is makes it feasible to compute the derivative of L f (x i , I p i ; θ ), i with respect to θ and update θ accordingly. During the testing process, when model parameters are xed, in order to get stable test results, we use the expectation of the Gaussian distribution N(µ p , σ 2 p ) as a substitute for the random variable p i . Speci cally, we generate a vector I p following the same procedure described earlier, but with p equal to µ p . 
Analysis: Model Resistance to Adversaries
We now theoretically analyze our model's ability to resist adversarial samples. First, recall (Section 2) that an adversary needs to generate adversarial perturbations in order to cra adversarial samples. According to Equation 1, the adversarial perturbation is generated by computing the derivative of the DNN's cost function with respect to the input samples. Now let us assume that an adversary uses the same procedure to a ack our proposed model. To be speci c, the adversary computes the partial derivative of L f (x, I p ; θ ),˜ with respect tox, wherex denotes an arbitrary testing sample and˜ denotes the corresponding label. More formally, the adversary needs to solve the following derivative:
where J L (q) = ∂L f (x, I p ; θ ),˜ /∂q(x, I p ). Here, as mentioned earlier, I p is a mask matrix used during testing. Once the derivative above (Equation (3)) is calculated, an adversarial sample can be cra ed by adding ϕ · si n(J L (x )) tox, following [9] . To resolve Equation (3), both J L (q) and ∂q(x, I p )/∂x need to be computed. Note that J L (q) can be easily solved using back propagation of errors. However, the term ∂q(x, I p )/∂x carries random variable I p . It is this multiplicative random variable I p itself that prohibits a ackers from computing a derivative needed to produce an adversarial perturbation. If I p is designed to be additive instead of multiplicative, the computation of the derivative will not be a ected since ∂q(x, I p )/∂x = ∂(x + I p )/∂x is equal to an all-one vector 1. As a result, the exact adversarial perturbation for x can be easily calculated as J L (q). In addition, prior work [11] has demonstrated that, using additive Gaussian noise does not actually improve the robustness of a DNN model against adversarial samples.
Recall that for each sample, the locations of the zeroes within I p are randomly distributed. It is almost impossible for an adversary to pick up a value for I p that will match that which was randomly generated. erefore, for this adversary, the best practice would be to approximate the value of I p . To allow this adversary to make the best possible approximation, we further assume that the value of p KDD 2017 Research Paper KDD'17, August 13-17, 2017, Halifax, NS, Canada is known. With this assumption, one can randomly sample I p and treat it as a best approximation I * p . Using this approximation, the adversary then computes the most powerful adversarial perturbation. As shown in the top shaded region of Figure 2 , for the black-boxed DNN, we assume the most powerful adversarial perturbation is δx.
en, the adversarial perturbation for real samplex is δx I * p . Assume the adversary uses a synthesized adversarial samplẽ x + δx I * p to a ack the system shown in the bo om shaded region of Figure 2 . As we can see, the synthesized sample must pass through the the feature nulli cation layer before passing through the actual DNN. We describe this nulli cation in the following form.
x + δx I *
Here,x I p is a nulli ed real sample, and δ I * p I p represents the adversarial perturbation added to it. With I * p I p , even though δx is the adversarial perturbation that impacts the DNN the most, this high-impact adversarial perturbation is still distorted and no longer represents the most e ective perturbation for fooling the DNN. In Section 5, we will provide empirical evidence to further validate this result.
In short, stochasticity, which naturally comes from I p , is potentially our best defense against adversarial perturbation. It is important to interpret our particular form of drop-out as a form of "security through randomness". Our parametrized feature nulli cation input layer, does not serve as a form of implicit model ensembling (or Bayesian averaging, which drop-out has been shown to be equivalent to in the case of single hidden-layer networks), especially given that randomness is still introduced at test-time.
Comparison with Existing Defense Methods
In the following, we thoroughly analyze the limited resistance provided by existing defense techniques introduced in Section 3. According to [13, 20, 24] , existing defense techniques can be generalized as training a standard DNN with various regularization terms (or even more generally as the DataGrad=regularized objective). More formally, the general objective is as follows: min
where L(θ,x,˜ ) is the training objective for a standard DNN, and R (θ,x,˜ ) is a regularization term. Here, γ controls the strength of the regularization. By adding regularization, (5) penalizes the direction represented by the adversarial perturbation that is optimal for cra ing adversarial samples. However, existing defense methods that fall under this unifying framework are still vulnerable to adversarial samples problems, as shown below. To cra an adversarial sample from a model trained by solving (5) , an adversary can easily produce an adversarial perturbation by computing the derivative with respect to a test samplẽ x as follows:
is indicates that prior studies only construct DNN models that are resistant to adversarial samples that target a standard DNN but do not build resistance to adversarial samples that would be generated to trick these newly "hardened" models. In addition, as we will show in Section 5, the added regularization only imposes a limited penalty to the most e ective adversarial perturbation. Hence these methods might still be ine ective against adversarial samples that target standard DNNs, especially if an adversary simply increases the scale factor ϕ when generating adversarial samples.
In other words, according to [9] , the space containing both real samples and adversarial samples is too broad to be exhaustively explored. In the end, since adversarial training is a form of data augmentation, it cannot possibly hope to fully solve this problem. While all machine learning methods are susceptible to a broad space of adversarial samples, our proposed method, however, is a modelcomplexity-based approach that hardly adds any extra parameters, thus leaving the per-iteration run-time relatively untouched.
EVALUATION
In this section, we rst evaluate our proposed technique and compare it with adversarial training and dropout for a malware classi cation task using the dataset from [4] . en we will show that our proposed method can be integrated with existing adversarial training methods and compare the combined approach's performance with both standalone methods -random feature nulli cation (RFN) and adversarial training, respectively. Finally, we will demonstrate the generality of our proposed method by conducting some experiments in image recognition. In particular, we contrast our method with adversarial training and dropout on the MNIST [16] and CIFAR-10 [15] datasets.
Datasets & Experimental Design
To comprehensively evaluate our method, we measure classi cation accuracy as well as model resistance to adversarial samples. In particular, to evaluate and compare the resistance of all three defense techniques, we test the DNN models against adversarial samples generated from the exact models trained either with RFN, adversarial training, and dropout. is means that we created three adversarial sample pools, one for each dataset (i.e., malware dataset, MNIST and CIFAR-10). e evaluation of resistance assumes that adversaries had acquired the full knowledge of each DNN model (i.e. hyper-parameters) and could construct the most e ective adversarial samples to the best of their abilities. In this experimental se ing, the observed resistance will then re ect a lower bound on model resistance against adversarial samples. For each dataset, we specify how to cra adversarial samples, especially with respect to the malware dataset.
Malware. e malware dataset we experimented with is a collection of window audit logs 4 . e dimensionality of the feature-space for each audit log sample is reduced to 10,000 according to the feature select metric used in the prior work [4] . Each feature indicates the occurrence of either a single event or a sequence of events 5 , thus taking on the value of 0 or 1. Here, 0 indicates that the sequence of events did not occur while 1 indicates the opposite. Classi cation labels are either 1, indicating a malware variant, or benign so ware samples and 3,000 malicious so ware samples. e task is to classify whether a given sample is benign or malicious.
Adversarial perturbation for malware samples can be computed according to Equation (1) . However, a bit of care must be taken when generating adversarial samples for the malware dataset. Malware samples are usually represented by features that take on discrete and nite values, e.g. records of le system accesses, types of system calls incurred, etc. erefore, it is more appropriate to use the l 0 distance:
wherex = x + δx represents adversarial samples generated from legitimate sample x. Note that on the malware data set, the perturbation scale ϕ in (1) is measured by ϵ. A similar approach [10] of cra ing adversarial samples for malware data is realized by adjusting the Jacobian-based saliency map approach [21] proposed for binary classi cation case. Furthermore, malware data contains stricter semantics in comparison to image data [10] . In our case, each feature of a malware sample indicates whether or not a potential bit of malware has initiated a certain le system access. erefore, large-scale manipulations across all features, as is typically done with image data, may break down a malicious program's functionality. To avoid this, we restrict the total number of manipulations that can occur per malware sample to be as small as possible. In this paper's se ing, we set this to be 10. Moreover, since removing certain le system calls may also jeopardize a malware's internal logic, we further restrict the manipulation by only allowing the addition of new le system accesses.
is equivocates to only positive manipulations, i.e. changing a feature from 0 to 1. Finally, since malware manipulation is done with the intent of fooling a DNN malware classi er, there is no need to modify a benign application such that it is classi ed as malicious. erefore, in our experiments we only generate adversarial samples from the malware data points. In Table 1 digits, ranging from 0 to 9. e dataset is split into a training set of 60,000 samples and a test set of 10,000 samples. e CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60,000 images, divided into 10 classes. e training split contains 50,000 samples while the test split contains 10,000 samples. Since the samples of CIFAR-10 dataset are color images, each image is made up of 32×32 pixels where each pixel is represented by three color channels (i.e., RGB).
For the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, we generate adversarial samples by simply adding the adversarial perturbation δx, introduced in Section 2), directly to the original image (since feature values are continuous/real-valued). e degree of manipulation is controlled by selecting di erent ϕ, as in Equation (1).
Malware Classi cation Results
Sensitivity to Nulli cation Rate We rst implement a group of experiments to quantify the e ect that nulli cation rates have on model classi cation accuracy as well as model resistance. More speci cally, we allow the nulli cation rate to range from 10% to 90% with 10% increments, both at training and testing time. By comparing each experiment result, we may then select the optimal nulli cation rate. We then integrate our defense mechanism with adversarial training and compare it against all aforementioned methods.
Measures of classi cation accuracy and model resistance, corresponding to di erent nulli cation rates, are shown in Table 2 . As observed in Table 2 , the classi cation accuracy of trained models decreases when the nulli cation rate is increased except when nulli cation rate is at 40% or 60%. ese two rates may roughly imply the proportion of noise contained within the original dataset. e average classi cation accuracy is 93.66% while the highest achieved is 95.22, when nulli cation rate is 10%. is shows us that classi cation performance is more negatively impacted as more important features are discarded. Note that the accuracy remains at a surprisingly high value even when the nulli cation rate reaches 90%. is aligns with the fact that the malware data is quite sparse.
On the contrary, as shown in Table 2 , model resistance shows the opposite trend. Maximum resistance against adversarial samples is reached at a 90% nulli cation rate. Clearly, with such a high nulli cation rate, more carefully manipulated features are discarded. e di erent trends for both classi cation accuracy and resistance demonstrate well the trade-o between achieving one of the two key goals (i.e., accuracy and robustness). By examining Table 2 , we adopt 80% as our feature nulli cation rate expectation for experiments that follow, as the trained model with this nulli cation rate maintains the best balance between resistance and accuracy.
Comparative Results Next, we implement ve distinct DNN models by training them with di erent learning techniques as speci ed in Table 3 . We present the architecture of these DNN models as well as the corresponding hyper-parameters in Table 7 , 6, 8 and 9. With certain perturbations added to the data samples, Table 3 rst shows that the standard DNN model exhibits poor resistance when classifying adversarial samples. Surprisingly, as shown for dropout and adversarial training, these two methods yield even worse resistance compared to the standard DNN. is strengthens our previous analysis in Section 4. Although these mechanisms have been shown to provide certain resistance to already seen adversarial samples and so-called 'cross-model' adversarial samples 6 , they are even more vulnerable to more speci cally cra ed adversarial samples. ese results are also consistent with those reported in previous work [11] . is implies that the regularization involved in adversarial training and dropout o er poor general resistance to adversarial examples.
In comparison, RFN provides a signi cantly be er resistance against adversarial samples, as is shown in Table 3 . e model resistance a orded by our method improves more than 100% (relative error) when comparing with standard DNN. Recall that RFN can also be viewed as a preprocessing approach for the successive DNN. As such, it can be combined with other existing defense mechanisms. It is expected that such a combination would further improve model robustness. In order to verify this, we next combine RNF with adversarial training and compare the hybrid approach to both standalone RFN and adversarial training. Table 3 speci es the classi cation accuracy and model resistance of the hybrid technique. We observe that the combined technique does indeed provide be er resistance when compared to standalone RFN. is may due to the fact that RFN and adversarial training penalize adversarial samples in two di erent manners, and an ensemble of the two favorably ampli es the model resistance that each technique induces. From Table 3 , we also notice that both 6 Adversarial samples that are cra ed from a di erent DNN that is built to approximate some standard targeted DNN. Hyper parameter σ is also set to be 0.05 in this evaluation.
standalone RFN and aforementioned combined approach do slightly but noticeably reduce classi cation accuracy. However, the combination of RFN and adversarial training results in near-negligible degradation. is indicates that RFN, either standalone or when combined with adversarial training, provides much be er resistance either adversarial training and dropout on the malware dataset.
Image Recognition Results
In the following experiments, we examine the generality of our proposed method by applying it to the MNIST and CIFAR-10 image recognition tasks. For MNIST, we build a standard feed-forward fully connected DNN, while for CIFAR-10, we build a convolutional neural network (CNN). Similar to the experiments implemented on malware dataset, we also implement two groups of experiments, one for determining the optimal p on each dataset, and another for comparing between di erent defense technologies. As is shown in Table 4 , the trend of accuracy and resistance are consistent with that found in the malware experiments. It should be noted that, since the malware samples are highly sparse in the feature space, we test our method with nulli cation rate varies in a wide range from 10% to 50%. However, the image data sets are far less sparse. In Table 4 , maximum resistance against adversarial image samples is reached at 50% nulli cation rate. With respect to classi cation accuracy, our proposed method demonstrates roughly similar performance at various nulli cation rates. Based on this result, we adopted 50% as our feature nulli cation rate in the experiments to follow.
In Table 5 , we show measures of classi cation accuracy and model resistance of all aforementioned approaches on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. Much as in the malware experiments, we further evaluate our RFN method combined with adversarial training on both datasets. In Table 5 , we also measure the resistance of these DNN models against various coe cients ϕ.
As is shown in Table 8 : e hyper parameters of CIFAR-10 models, in this experiment we use CNN instead of standard DNN that the resistance provided by these methods might be highly dependent on the data type (images, in this case). In particular, since adversarial training is designed to handle adversarial samples, it demonstrates much be er resistance when compared directly to dropout, though both methods o er model regularization.
As for classi cation accuracy, dropout achieves the highest accuracy on both datasets. For MNIST dataset, both RFN and adversarial training, as well as their combination, do trade some classi cation accuracy for be er resistance. However, for the CIFAR-10 dataset, these methods demonstrate slightly improvement for accuracy. is is due to the fact that the CIFAR-10 task is much more complex than that of MNIST, hence the regularization provided by all of these methods leads to improved generalization. In general, despite the minor accuracy degradation caused by using RFN or the hybrid method, the signi cant improvement over resistance in both datasets demonstrates that our proposed method is quite promising for classi cation tasks when resistance to adversarial samples is important. Finally, our method is agnostic to the choice of the DNN architecture, given that we evaluate RFN with both feed-forward fully connected DNNs and CNNs (as evidenced in Table 5 ).
CONCLUSION
Here we proposed a simple method for constructing deep neural network models that are robust to adversarial samples. Our design is based on a thorough analysis of a neural model's vulnerability to adversarial perturbation as well as the limitations of previously proposed defenses. Using our proposed Random Feature Nulli cation, we have shown that it is impossible for an a acker to cra a speci cally designed adversarial sample that can force a DNN to misclassify its inputs. is implies that our proposed technology does not su er, as previous methods do, from a acks that rely on generating model-speci c adversarial samples.
We apply our method to a malware dataset and empirically demonstrated that we signi cantly improve model resistance with only negligible sacri ce of accuracy, compared to other defense Table 9 : e network structure of CIFAR-10 models.
mechanisms. Cross-data generality was also demonstrated through experiments on image recognition. Future work will entail investigating the performance of our method to an even wider variety of applications.
